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Abstract
The Fourth Crusade, a war called to recapture Jerusalem, ended in disaster for the Christian
city of Constantinople and the city of Jerusalem remained untouched by the crusading host. The
fact that a war called to protect Christians in the Middle East and to recapture the city of
Jerusalem for God resulted in the sacking of one of the largest Christian cities has led to much
scholarly investigation into what exactly caused this to transpire. For the better part of a
millennium scholars have sought answers to significant questions and have produced a variety
of explanations for why the crusade ultimately failed. These theories range from conspiracy to
random chance but debate still rages on between scholars about possible answers to these long
deliberated questions.
This study will relies mainly upon the primary sources of some of the crusaders who were a
part of the crusade and some of their contemporaries for evidence to support this claim.
Geoffrey de Villehardouin along with some of his contemporaries, such as Robert of Clari,
recorded their knowledge and experience of the Fourth Crusade and are the main primary
sources used for this study. This study also makes extensive use of secondary literature, such as
the work of Thomas Madden and Donald Queller, regarding both the Fourth Crusade itself and
the theories that have been conceived to explain both its diversion and ultimate failure.
The purpose of this study is to try to provide conceivable answers to these long
discussed questions by looking at the crusade using a different technique that combines certain
aspects of noted scholars’ analyses with a style of looking at the crusade by dividing it into
separate periods of time. By analyzing the Fourth crusade with this method the study aims to
provide possible explanations for certain major events by analyzing specific internal dynamics
and leadership transitions that this study claims to be responsible, to some degree, for both the
diversion and ultimate failure of the Fourth Crusade. The goal of this study is to prove that
internal dynamics that include: the changing goals of the leadership, desertions, polarization of
the crusading party, and justifying actions as a means to an end, along with leadership
transitions are at least partially responsible for both the diversion and ultimate failure of the
Fourth Crusade.
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Executive Summary
This project is a research based thesis on the Fourth Crusade that focuses on potential
causes of its well-documented diversions and ultimate failure. The Fourth Crusade began as a
military pilgrimage to Jerusalem to re-capture it from Muslim Ayyubid forces and protect the
Christians who lived in the Holy Land; however, the crusade never reached the Holy Land and
never accomplished its original goals. Instead of attacking the Muslim occupiers of the Holy
Land, the crusade resulted in the killing of thousands of Christians and the sacking of one of the
largest and most important Christian cities, Constantinople. The fact that a crusade that was
launched to retake Jerusalem and protect Christians actually resulted in the destruction of a
major Christian city and didn’t set foot in the Holy Land has sparked much debate among
scholars for well over eight centuries. As a result of this lengthy scholarly debate, there is no
shortage of theories as to why the crusade ultimately diverted and failed. Possible explanations
for the failure of the Fourth Crusade include random chance, sabotage, and even treason.
However, this thesis proposes that there is another possible explanation for both the diversions
and ultimate failure of the Fourth Crusade; that the diversions and ultimate failure of the
Fourth Crusade were not the outcome of any one group controlling things all along, but instead
reveal the shifting influence exerted by various parties and their shifting motives throughout
the crusade and that leadership transitions and internal dynamic shifts provide evidence for
this.
This thesis puts forward the idea that leadership transitions and the related internal
dynamics shifts of the crusading host, resulted in its diversion from its original goals and its
ultimate failure in those very same goals. The crusading host, in this study, refers to both the
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crusaders and the accompanying Venetian forces. Leadership transitions refers to shifting
influence among groups within or associated with the crusading host. These shifts in leadership,
this thesis argues, were a major factor in both the direction and result of the crusade because
whatever group had more power seemed to be able to divert the crusade. The leadership
transitions occurred both between and within groups involved with the crusade and often
resulted in the changing of direction, objectives, and even desertion.
Internal dynamic shifts also played an important role in the diversion and failure of the
crusade. In this study, internal dynamics refers primarily to the struggles among the crusading
host, especially among the crusaders. There are four major internal dynamics that this paper
examines: the changing goals of the leadership; desertions; polarization of the crusading party;
and justifying actions as a means to an end. The changing goals of the leadership is an internal
dynamics closely related to leadership transition and simply means that when a group ascended
into a position of influence over the crusade, the goals of the crusade seem to shift without
ever losing sight of the ultimate goal of Jerusalem. Desertions refers to the exclusively crusader
phenomenon during this crusade in which thousands of crusaders left the crusade due to
various reasons, such as morals or lack of urgency, and resulted in the failure of the Fourth
Crusade. The polarization of the crusading party is also a uniquely crusader phenomenon in
which there were two major groups of crusaders, one pushing for the immediate assault on
Jerusalem and another group which was more pragmatic about the situation. The group that
wanted to go directly to Jerusalem made their judgement based upon religion and morality
while the other group made their judgment based upon necessity and strategy. Justifying
actions as a means to the end is closely related to the polarization of the crusading party and
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was used by the group of crusaders who weren’t pushing to immediately go to the Holy Land
and this dynamic allowed the crusade to be diverted twice and thus contributed to the failure
of the crusade as well.
The findings of the study are that different groups had power at different times and this,
along with specific internal dynamics, contributed, on some level, to the diversions and failure
of the Fourth Crusade. This isn’t to say that other theories are incorrect, but that this may help
explain long debated questions about the Fourth Crusade. Perhaps this theory, when combined
with other theories such as the belief the crusade failed due to random chance, may provide a
more complete or different view of the Fourth Crusade, its diversions, and its ultimate failure.
The methodology used for this project was research based with a focus on primary
sources. Two main primary sources were used in this study, Geoffrey de Villehardouin and
Robert of Clari. Both of these men were a part of the Fourth Crusade and offer a perspective
from that of the leadership and the common soldier, respectively. Secondary scholarly works
were also used in this study to analyze other approaches to the study of the Fourth Crusade
and were also used to provide additional evidence to support the thesis of the project.
While using mainly primary sources, this study takes a unique approach by dividing the
Fourth Crusade into three parts and examining each period individually before analyzing the
crusade as a whole. Breaking the crusade into periods not only helps to focus study but viewing
the crusade in smaller portions allows for further insight that previously would be hard if not
impossible to gain if viewed as a single event. The focusing of the crusade also will allow for a
more extensive study of leadership transitions and internal dynamic shifts and, in turn, possibly
provide an explanation for why the Fourth Crusade was diverted and ultimately failed. This
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study chose to divide the crusade into three periods abased upon the “natural partition points”
that occur during the crusade. These points occur during times of great tension, diversion, and
even desertion. Therefore, by focusing on the partition points and the transitions between
different parts of the crusade, an overarching theme, in regards to the leadership transitions
and internal dynamics, becomes visible.
This project’s main goal, in regards to scholarship of the Fourth Crusade, is to add to the
discussion. With the available sources, and the biased nature of them, it is very hard to know
what happened conclusively during the crusade. However, this doesn’t mean that this crusade
shouldn’t be studied. Just because there may not be an answer now, or ever, it is important to
have discussion of the Fourth Crusade because of its drastic impact on Europe, the Middle East,
and the world. The crusade that started out as a mission to protect Christians in the Holy Land
and to retake Jerusalem crippled a major Christian power, Byzantium. This led to the
destabilization of the region and the ascendancy of Venice as a major Imperial trading power
since their biggest competitors of the time, the Byzantines, were crippled. Thus, the crusade
called to attack Muslim forces actually led to the destruction of a longstanding Christian empire
and led to the ascendancy of a new Christian force in Europe.
Even though this project cannot conclusively say what caused the diversions or the
failure of the Fourth Crusade, having a continuing dialogue about not only different
possibilities, but also different ways to look at the crusade are very beneficial. Being able to
look at something in a new way may prompt another scholar to do the same and perhaps lead
to another new theory or breakthrough that previously was not explored. Proposing ideas and
having a constructive discussion about the validity and ramifications of such a finding are an
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integral part of the historical field and the overall goal of this study is to be a part of the greater
discussion about the Fourth Crusade and propose a new way to look at the Fourth Crusade and
those involved in it.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Fourth Crusade — a war called by the papacy that began as a military pilgrimage to
Jerusalem to recapture the city for Christians and God — ended in disaster for the Christian city
of Constantinople while the city of Jerusalem remained untouched by the crusading host. The
fact that a war that was called in the apparent defense of Christianity in the Middle East
resulted in the sacking of one of the largest Christian cities has led to much scholarly
investigation on exactly what caused this to occur. For the better part of a millennium scholars
have sought answers to key questions and have produced a variety of explanations for why the
crusade ultimately failed. These range from conspiracy theories to random chance, but debate
still occurs among scholars about what exactly the answers could be. By closely examining
leadership transitions and internal dynamics this study hopes to prove is that several groups
with different and even shifting motives had more or less influence at different stages in the
Crusade. The study also hopes to show that the diversions and the ultimate failure of the
Fourth Crusade are a result of these leadership transitions and internal dynamics and their
related effects.
This study will rely mainly upon the primary sources of some of the crusaders who were
a part of this crusade and a selection of their contemporaries for evidence to support this claim.
Geoffrey de Villehardouin along with some of his contemporaries, including Robert of Clari,
recorded their knowledge and experience of the Fourth Crusade and provide the main primary
sources used in this study. These sources are invaluable to understanding a crusade that is still
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being debated today. However, these sources leave many questions unresolved. The accounts
of the Fourth Crusade are few and far between and often have conflicting details that cannot
be reconciled. Many sources also have excessive bias, portraying events in a deceitful light that
makes the reality of the situation hard to discern. Since the sources are heavily biased and
written from different perspectives, they offer polarized views about the crusade that have led
to the differentiation of scholarly views that will be discussed below. Therefore, the challenge
of analyzing these sources to determine the truth behind the bias of the Fourth Crusade has
been going on for more than 800 years without a single explanation or answer being endorsed
as the only possible answer by experts.
In order to better understand the plan and direction of this study, it is important to have
a basic understanding of the Fourth Crusade. The Fourth Crusade was called by Innocent III in
1198 as a response to the loss of Jerusalem to the forces of Saladin.1 The crusaders gathered
forces and the port of Venice was selected as the point of embarkation for the main crusading
force; a treaty was signed with the Venetians to ensure supplies and transportation. 2 However,
not enough crusaders arrived at the port when they were supposed to, and this led to the
crusaders becoming indebted to the Venetians. 3 This resulted in the crusaders helping the
Venetians to attack or capture several Christian cities, including Zara, in the vicinity of Venetian
territory as a way to delay payment of what the crusaders owed.4 This diverted the crusade

Innocent III, “Post miserabile,” in Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent
III to the Fall of Acre, 1187–1291, ed. Jessalynn Bird, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell, (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 50.
2
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, Chronicle of The Fourth Crusade and The Conquest of Constantinople, trans Frank T.
Marzials, (London: J.M. Dent, 1908), 5, 9.
3
Ibid, 16.
4
Ibid, 17, 31-32.
1

2

from its intended purpose to retake Jerusalem. This diversion led to much dissension among
the crusaders, which would periodically flare up, especially in times of great moral crises, such
as the attack on Zara or when the crusaders discussed whether they should divert the crusade a
second time to Constantinople to help reinstall the dethroned emperor, Alexius IV, in exchange
for support for the crusade. 5 The decision to aid Alexius led to conflict between the crusading
host and the Byzantines who controlled Constantinople, which in turn led to the capture of
Constantinople by crusader and Venetian forces in 1204 and the end of the Fourth Crusade
soon thereafter without the crusade even setting foot in the Holy Land.6
Possibly due to the bias and discrepancy of primary sources, there are many details that
are not agreed upon and even polarize studies of the Fourth Crusade. 7 Many questions are still
debated and haven’t been reconciled: Who exactly was directing the crusade? Why did the
crusade divert twice? Who is ultimately responsible for the outcome of the Fourth Crusade?
These questions are still debated as evidenced by the introduction to a work by Thomas
Madden, a medievalist. 8
As previously stated, historians have sought to explain the diversion of the crusade ever
since it occurred, and due to the hundreds of years of study, there is no shortage of theories
concerning the precise cause of the Crusade’s diversion. Dr. Jonathan Harris has discussed the
many theories that have been proposed for the diversion and discusses the evolution of
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Ibid, 17, 24-26.
Ibid, 64-65.
7
These discrepancies and biases will be discussed further in the paper.
8
Thomas Madden, “Outside and Inside the Fourth Crusade,” International History Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Nov.,
1995): 726; in this Madden discusses an argument among a large group of scholars regarding who is responsible
and what caused the diversion of the Fourth Crusade.
6
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theories over time. 9 From the conclusion of the crusade through the 1870s theories of a
Venetian conspiracy were popular and seemed all but certain according to Harris. 10 These
theories were generally considered unsubstantiated after an 1877 article by Gabriel Hanotaux
who discredited some of the evidence used to support the Venetian diversion theory. 11
However, even though the theory was largely discredited, Harris does cite some continued
support for it in the scholarly community. 12 The article then discusses a theory that is still used
to explain the crusade, the modified theory of accidents, which was “something of a synthesis
of the theory of accidents and the treason theories” and was proposed by Walter Norden in
twentieth century.13 As evidenced by Harris’ article, the account of Thomas Madden, and the
continued debate among historians, there seems to be no shortage of explanations for the
Fourth Crusade and no shortage of ways in which to approach it study.
According to Thomas Madden, in order to better understand the diversion of the Fourth
Crusade we must “move inside” the crusade and understand the people who were involved. 14 A
greater understanding of the Crusade could be gained through the study of the people involved

Jonathan Harris, “The Debate on the Fourth Crusade,” History Compass, Volume 2, Issue 1 (2004).
Ibid, 2-4.
11
Ibid, 4-5; Hanotaux re-dated a piece of evidence, a Venetian treaty with the Sultan of Babylon, long used by
scholars to support the Venetian diversion theory. This theory that states that the Venetians purposefully diverted
the crusade for their own means. In this case, it was claimed that they diverted the crusade from the Holy Land
because of a secret treaty with the sultan of Babylon. This was disproven by the revision of the date of the treaty
to several years after the conclusion of the Fourth Crusade, thus discrediting a major piece of evidence for the
theory.
12
Ibid, 5.
13
Ibid, 6; The theory proposed by Norden stated that an attack on Constantinople was not surprising and many
western leaders had reasons for desiring it. This isn’t to say that an attack was planned during the Fourth Crusade,
but that once the army was at Constantinople, with provocation, the western leaders seized the opportunity
before them. According to Harris, this theory proved very influential and is still used as an explanation as to why
the Fourth Crusade diverted and ultimately failed; Harris, “Debate,” 6.
14
Thomas Madden, “Outside and Inside the Fourth Crusade,” International History Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Nov.,
1995): 743.
9

10
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in the crusade with a focus on their goals and actions. The approach of focusing on individuals
and analyzing them in depth by trying to ascertain some sense of their goals, beliefs, fears, and
thought processes is one way to analyze the Fourth Crusade. Scholars can accomplish this by
gathering primary sources and using them to try to discern information and possibly the
thoughts of those involved in the Fourth Crusade. By looking at the inner workings and the
internal struggles of the crusade, this study can provide possible explanations for two questions
regarding the Fourth Crusade: What caused the diversion of the Fourth Crusade and what
ultimately resulted in its failure?
While studying every individual’s goals, reactions, and thoughts would be ideal, it is not
possible with the sources available. Therefore, the approach of this study is to focus on
individuals about whom we know the most. A group we seem to have the most information
about is the leadership of the crusade. Studying the leadership is a logical choice since these
were the people who ultimately decided the direction of the crusade. Leaders such as Doge
Dandolo, Pope Innocent III, Boniface of Montferrat, and Alexius IV among others give us some
insight into the various groups involved in the crusade: the Venetian crusaders, the Christian
church, the crusaders, and even the Byzantines. While these leaders may not be representative
of their respective associated groups they do provide some information that can be used in this
study. The works of Geoffrey de Villehardouin and Robert of Clari are the main contemporary
sources for the crusading leadership, the Venetians, and the pope.15 The contemporary source

Villehardouin, Chronicle; Robert de Clari: “La Prise de Constantinople,” Complete texts and noted from Dana C.
Munro, "The Fourth Crusade,” in Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History, Vol 3:1,
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, [n.d.] 189?), 1-18.

15
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that relays the Byzantine perspective of the crusade comes from Nicetas Choniates. 16 While
these sources are not absolute truth and do contain discrepancies, they are the foundation of
the modern understanding of the Fourth Crusade and underpin many studies of the Fourth
Crusade, including this one.
However, if only the leadership was studied, we would most likely miss out on an
important view of the crusade, that of the ordinary rank and file soldiers. Therefore, in order to
try and gain a more complete view of the crusade, the ordinary soldiers must also be analyzed
on some level, although this will be more difficult because the primary sources related to the
Fourth Crusade were largely written by leaders or focus on the leadership. Nevertheless, one
source in particular, Robert of Clari, contains some information about what ordinary soldiers
believed or heard and thus could be a highly valuable source in trying to gain a more complete
view of the Fourth Crusade. 17
Focusing on individuals also allows for the study of the internal dynamics of the crusade
and leadership transitions, which ultimately seem to have had great influence over the crusade
as a whole. Internal dynamics, in this study, refers primarily to the struggles among the
crusaders themselves. This study focuses on four internal dynamics: the changing goals of the
leadership; desertions; polarization of the crusading party; and justifying actions as a means to
an end.18 While these internal dynamics play a very important role in both the direction and the

Nicetas Choniates, O City of Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniatēs, Trans Harry J. Magoulias, (Detroit,
Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1984.
17
Robert of Clari was a knight in the crusading army and perhaps is writing from the perspective of an ordinary
soldier in the crusade.
18
“Crusading party” and “crusaders,” in the context of this study, strictly refers to the non-Venetian members of
the crusade while the term “crusading host” refers to both the Venetians and the non-Venetian crusaders.
16
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ultimate result of the crusade, another very closely related dynamic, leadership transitions,
plays an even more important role. As such, it can be considered an internal dynamic and will
be analyzed independently in this study. 19
A leadership transition in this study simply means when one group who has power and
influence over the crusade and its direction loses this power or influence to another group.
Thus, whenever there is a leadership transition between groups, not within a group, the
direction of the crusade tends to shift or become diverted. This does not mean that at all times
only one group had control of the crusade. There was a constant power struggle between
factions within the crusade who were all seeking to gain the upper hand, in order to further
their goals and their vision of the crusade. A great example of a leadership transition is when
the crusaders decide to help the Venetians capture Zara.20
While this idea of studying the individuals involved in the crusade is certainly not new,
perhaps by taking a slightly different approach to studying the crusade a new way of thinking
about the crusade may arise. Breaking down the crusade into periods allows for a thorough
study of individuals, internal undercurrents that affected the crusade, and leadership changes
and a more focused view on a smaller portion of the crusade that may not be looked at as
closely if the crusade was studied as whole. This approach, accompanied with dividing the

19

It is important to note that leadership transitions are very closely related to the changing internal dynamics of
the Fourth Crusade. Often times when there is a major leadership change, there are also changes to the internal
dynamics. When a new group ascends to power or gains influence, the primary objectives of the crusade seem to
shift. That said, the ultimate goal of the Fourth Crusade never seems to be forgotten but, depending on what
leadership was ascendant, it may have been considered secondary to the other objectives held by the group.
20
Villehardouin, Chronicle, 16; This will be further explained during the analysis of the second period of the
crusade later in this paper.
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crusade into periods, should provide a more complete view of the Fourth Crusade and help to
explain both the diversion and failure of the crusade.
Dividing the Fourth Crusade into time periods accomplishes more than just focusing
study. There seem to be two natural points of partition that occur during the crusade as a result
of certain inner dynamics and leadership shifts coming to a head. Analyzing two points — after
the failure of the crusaders to fulfil their treaty with the Venetians and after the conquest of
Zara, — can provide insight and give evidence of both the shifting internal forces at work and
the leadership changes that occurred during the course of the crusade. These two natural
partition points occur during periods in which important events in the crusade are occurring,
and these event ultimately shape and direct the course of the crusade. By dividing the crusade
into smaller parts and viewing these periods separately, insight is gained that previously would
be hard if not impossible to gain if viewed as a single event. This division of the crusade,
because it allows for a focused study of the leadership of the crusade, may provide evidence of
who or what was driving the crusade at a particular time.
Using this strategy means there are three distinct time periods to study in the Fourth
Crusade. These three periods are separated by two major events that naturally create breaking
points chronologically and have widespread effects on the course of the Fourth Crusade and
the people involved. Breaking the crusade into parts denies the assumption that a group or
person who had influence in one period has the same influence or power in another period. If
this strategy is to be successful then each period must first be analyzed independently. Once
each period has been analyzed and conclusions drawn independently then the periods can be
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analyzed as a whole. By first analyzing periods independently then analyzing them together
further conclusions can be drawn by analyzing patterns that occur throughout the crusade.
The three time periods used in this study for the Fourth Crusade are August 1198
through mid-October 1202, mid-October 1202 through early 1203, and early 1203 through the
end of the crusade. The first period covers the calling of the crusade by Pope Innocent III with
Post miserabile on 15 August 1198 through the gathering of the crusader army at Venice and
failure to meet the payment they promised the Venetians in October 1202. 21 This study views
this segment as one period because it begins with the conception of the crusade and ends at
the first naturally occurring partition point. This period ends when a major event — the failure
of the crusaders to pay the Venetians —occurs and is considered singular period because it is a
continuous and ends with a major leadership transition, a shift of internal dynamics, and
diversion.22
The second period, which is the shortest period but the most dynamic, starts with the
aftermath of the crusaders failing to pay off the Venetians. 23 This results in a defining decision
in the Fourth Crusade and leads to another major event, the attack on Zara. The new
agreement with the Venetians and the attack on Zara are so closely related and occur so close

Geoffrey de Villehardouin, Chronicle, 9, 15-17; Innocent III, “Post miserabile,” 50.
The natural partition points which separate the three periods have major shifts in internal dynamics, have
significant leadership transitions and lead to a diversion. What this means is that during two specific natural
partition points there is a massive amount of tension that surfaces in the form of desertions, threats of desertions,
possibility of diversion which lead to some form of leadership transition which ultimately leads to a diversion. This,
in turn, has a great effect on the Fourth Crusade and these partition points occur during two periods of time in
which major decisions are made that ultimately divert the crusade and result in its failure. Therefore, since a goal
of this study is to better understand the diversion of the Fourth Crusade, these natural partition points can help by
focusing attention on these time periods that seem to have the most surfacing of internal dynamics and leadership
transitions which, in turn, could help in the understanding of how or why the Fourth Crusade was diverted.
23
Villehardouin, Chronicle, 15.
21
22
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to one another that it makes a logical single time period, one that is and ends with a shift in
internal dynamics and right before another significant leadership transition. This period
features the most extensive leadership transition and the internal dynamics of the Crusade
become much more visible due to the short amount of time in this period and the major events
that occur at the beginning, the attack on Zara, and at the end, the meeting and eventual
agreement with Alexius IV. 24 This period is also punctuated on both sides with a major diversion
of the crusade.
The third period begins after the siege of Zara and the major event that occurs in the
start of this period is when the crusaders hear from Alexius IV. This message from Alexius IV
and the resulting decision to aid him in retaking Constantinople is another defining point of the
Fourth Crusade that ultimately decides its remaining direction.25 This period extends to the
conclusion of the crusade and started with a defining event that led to a shift in the internal
dynamics and a leadership transition and diversion. Therefore, while all three periods of the
crusade share similar characteristics, they can be typified as their own independent time
partitions. They all have continuity and either end or begin with major leadership transitions or
shifts in internal dynamics of the crusading host.
There are four areas in which these time partitions help in studying the Fourth Crusade.
First, this method can show how the reins of leadership passed among parties during the
crusade. Second, it can provide a perspective by which we can view the crusade in a way that
can allow us to better see whether or not a single group could be responsible for diverting the

24
25

Ibid, 15, 30.
Ibid, 15.
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crusade or if the situation was more complex. Third, it can help to discern possible reasons why
the crusade was diverted and give some rationale for the diversions. Finally, dividing the
crusade chronologically allows for a more focused study of the crusade along with its internal
dynamics and leadership transitions that may ultimately result in a better understanding of the
diversion of the Fourth Crusade and its ultimate failure.
By using this approach, evidence should emerge that several groups, with different and
even shifting motives, had more or less influence at different stages in the Crusade and this
shifting influence and to a lesser extent, control, is at least partially responsible for the
diversion of the Fourth Crusade and its ultimate failure. If this evidence is found then this could
prove that the diversion and ultimate failure of the Fourth Crusade were not the outcome of
any one group controlling things all along, but instead reveal the shifting influence exerted by
various parties and their shifting motives throughout the crusade. The approach of this study is
to analytically progress through the crusade in the above manner while offering a synopsis of
events and then analyzing the events in terms and the internal dynamics that are present in
that period. The inner undercurrents will also be compared between time periods in order to
understand the changes better.
The study will proceed in a similar fashion with regard to analyzing leadership
transitions that primarily occur around the partition points and will discuss what it means both
in terms of that specific time period and how it relates to the transitions that occur in the other
periods. The Fourth Crusade will be examined, in this study, by using primary sources and the
analysis of modern scholars. The evidence provided by this analysis could show a new way of
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looking at the Fourth Crusade and in turn shed light on the diversion and ultimate failure of the
Fourth Crusade.
Villehardouin seems to provide information from the perspective of one of the crusade
leaders.26 He also writes about other members of the crusading leadership, which may provide
an accurate perspective in relation to the other leaders as well from Villehardouin. 27
Villehardouin was one of the six envoys sent to Venice to negotiate the contract that the
crusaders ultimately failed to fulfill. 28 Villehardouin continues to represent the crusaders as
both a leader and envoy throughout the crusade and is selected as one of the envoys who
negotiated terms with the Byzantines when Alexius IV was re-installed. 29 While Villehardouin
certainly has his biases and inaccuracies in his writing, he is still an invaluable source for the
Fourth Crusade due to his leadership role within the crusade and involvement with the crusade.
Robert of Clari, a knight, is also a valuable source for this portion of the Fourth Crusade.
His perspective is very valuable because the other main primary source of the Fourth Crusade,
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that of Villehardouin, is from the perspective of the leadership while Clari’s is of that of an
ordinary solider. Clari also gives historians a larger source and knowledge base to work with
instead of just having to draw from Villehardouin. Having two main sources from the crusader
perspective is also useful because they can be used to corroborate information and thus
provide a potentially more accurate account of events.
Because Clari’s account provides challenges to Villehardouin’s information this calls into
question the validity of both accounts, which encourages the questioning of the sources and
not just the acceptance of their accounts. This questioning of sources has led to a continuation
of a scholarly discussion about the Fourth Crusade that this study adds to by re-examining
questions in regards to both the diversion and failure of the Fourth Crusade. Both Clari and
Villehardouin are great sources for the Fourth Crusade because of their wealth of information
with regard to the internal struggles and changes in leadership that this study focuses on.

Chapter Two: The First Period
The first period of the Fourth Crusade is a time of relative stability in terms of internal
dynamics and leadership transitions. Yet this period has inner struggles and changes, but they
are much less frequent and have less impact on the course of the crusade than the ones that
occur during later periods. The first period is important because it sets in motion the crusade
and the decisions made during this period —using Venice as a port of embarkation — which
have serious repercussions throughout the crusade.

13

In his letter Post miserabile, 30 Pope Innocent III called for the clergy and nobles to gather
soldiers in order to retake the Holy Land from the Muslim Ayyubids. 31 Despite crusading
indulgences that could grant remission of sins, the Fourth Crusade was slow to start and didn’t
really begin to grow and mobilize until Fulk of Neuilly preached in support of the crusade during
a tournament at Ecry in 1199.32 According to Villehardouin, after the tournament, many more
counts joined as crusaders, including two high barons of France, Simon de Montfort and
Renaud de Montmirail.33 Pope Innocent III realized that funds needed to be raised to support
the crusade and sent out letters to the great churches of Europe asking the clergy for a
monetary contribution of a fortieth part of their income. 34 Innocent also was willing to
contribute substantially out of his own poorly endowed treasury and promoted the raising of
funds in churches for the crusade by gathering donations from the laity. 35
One of the first important endeavors of the Fourth Crusade, besides raising soldiers and
money, was undertaken by the envoys selected by the barons, including Villehardouin, who had
taken the cross in order to find transportation for the crusade. 36 Villehardouin and the other
representatives were tasked with finding secure passage to the Holy Land for the Crusade.37
The envoys decided upon Venice and entered into negotiations with the doge of Venice, Enrico
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Dandolo, and the council of Venice. 38 After a week of discussion the Venetians agreed to make
a compact with the crusaders. 39 The Venetians agreed to provide ships for 4,500 horses, 9,000
esquires, 4,500 knights, and 20,000 foot soldiers and nine months’ worth of food, for both the
horses and men.40 Along with ships and food the Venetians also agreed to send fifty armed
galleys to join in the crusade if the crusaders would split all captured land or money evenly with
the Venetians. 41 The envoys agreed to the terms established by the Venetians, the treaty was
ratified by both parties in March 1201, and messengers were sent to Pope Innocent III who also
ratified the treaty.42
In the summer of 1202, between the signing of the treaty and when the crusaders were
supposed to arrive in Venice, there were some changes within the crusading leadership. The
original leader, Count Thibaut of Champagne, died shortly after the treaty was ratified with
Venice. 43 This led to the first shift of power in the crusading leadership; however, this was not
due to politics or leverage like future shifts would be. In 1201, a group of crusaders met after
the death Count Thibaut and elected Boniface de Montferrat as the new leader of the
crusade. 44
Even though the crusade was experiencing problems crusaders pushed forward and in
the summer of 1202 departed their lands to rendezvous in Venice.45 According to the treaty,
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the plan was for the entire crusading army to gather in Venice and depart from its port.
However, not all of the crusaders followed this plan for various reasons and this led to
significantly fewer crusaders arriving in Venice than was planned in the treaty. 46 The crusaders
were stationed on the island of St. Nicholas in Venice. 47After the time had passed in which the
crusading army was to arrive, the doge of Venice and the Venetians went to the crusaders and
demanded payment for the navy and the supplies that had been prepared as per the treaty. 48
At this point, perhaps one of the most important happenings in all of the Fourth Crusade
occurred when, according to both Villehardouin and Robert of Clari, less than half of the
expected crusaders arrived. 49 Of the 33,500 soldiers for which the Venetians had built ships,
only about one-third showed up, according to Villehardouin. 50 Robert of Clari noted that of the
planned 4,000 knights and 100,000 foot soldiers only 1,000 knights and around 50,000 foot
soldiers reported. 51 While these numbers vary greatly between accounts, both verify that a
larger crusader army was expected in Venice and that this lack of soldiers made it impossible
for the crusaders who were in Venice to pay off the debt to which they had agreed in the
contract.52 According to Villehardouin and Robert of Clari, the Venetians postponed their entire
maritime commerce for a year and a half in order to complete their part of the treaty and
expected nothing less than the complete fulfillment of the treaty. 53
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The large discrepancy between actual arrivals and the expected number created a
difficult position for the crusaders and the Venetians. According to Villehardouin, many
crusaders opted to use other ports instead of Venice as planned by the delegates or just never
set out, thus not allowing the crusaders to pay the sum they owed the Venetians. 54 While this
may just be an excuse formulated by Villehardouin to save face, there is evidence that supports
his claim that some crusaders did use other ports. Villain of Nully and Henry of Longchamp
among others decided to go to Apulia instead of Venice and seek passage to the Holy Land from
there. 55 Some historians such as Donald Queller, Thomas Compton, and Donald Campbell make
a claim very closely related to the claims of this study: that different groups most likely used the
crusade for their own means. 56 They also claim that one reason why there were insufficient
crusaders at Venice was due to the lack of cohesion of the crusading army and the fact that
many of the leaders had their own goals and only “felt bound to the army only so long as it
served them.” 57 The idea that different groups had different goals and could have used the
crusade to their advantage coincides with the premise of this study. Due to this possible lack of
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cohesion and the resulting shortage, the crusaders were detained in Venice on the island of St.
Nicholas until they could repay their debt. 58 However, when the Venetians realized the
crusaders would still be unable to pay, they devised a new strategy.
From Villehardouin’s and Clari’s accounts a picture begins to emerge of the many
different groups involved with the crusade. What is not readily apparent — but becomes more
visible in the next two periods — are the differences in goals and ethics among the various
groups involved in the crusade. In this period, the four main internal dynamics this study
focuses on are not present and there are only minor leadership transitions within the crusading
party. Although this first period does not seem to be very important in the overall outcome of
the Fourth Crusade, one would be mistaken to believe this. This period sets in motion the
Fourth Crusade through the ratification of the treaty with Venice, which would grant the
Venetians great power and control over the crusade during certain periods and ultimately lead
to the diversion of the Fourth Crusade in the second and third periods.

Chapter 3: Analysis of the First Period
The first period of the Fourth Crusade was relatively calm with respect to leadership
transitions and internal dynamics. This period does have a few leadership transitions that occur
within the crusading party itself but does not have any leadership transitions between groups
that characterize the later periods. This period also lacks significant internal dynamics changes,
very unlike the other two periods. However, the events that occur during this period seem to
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have created an environment in which future internal dynamics change and greatly affect the
course and result of the Fourth Crusade.
The initial period of the crusade marks the first time the reins of the crusade begin to
shift hands. Pope Innocent III, when he initiated the crusade in 1198, was, for all intents and
purposes, its leader.59 In his Post miserabile, he laid out his plan for the crusade and the
objectives he sought to accomplish. In this declaration Innocent III stated that he was ashamed
and upset at the fall of the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem and the slaughter of Christians
there. 60 By means of a crusade he sought to retake Jerusalem from the Muslim Ayyubids and
rescue the remaining Christians there were while defending the land of Christ from infidels61
Innocent made a plea to his fellow Christians after the “lamentable slaughter of Christendom,
after the deplorable invasion of that land on which the feet of Christ had stood” to “…arouse
the nations of Christendom to fight the battles of Christ and to avenge the injuries done to him
crucified.” 62 He also called those hearing his plea to action by saying that “…our inheritance has
gone to strangers, our houses to alien people.” 63 Ignoring the fiery rhetoric of Innocent, a call
by the church to right a spiritual injustice was nonetheless made. Innocent claims that the
Muslim Ayyubids stole what was rightfully the Christians’ and, more importantly, Christ’s and
they must seek justice and “rush to the aid of him by whom you exist and live and have your
being.” 64 The retaking of the Holy Land from the infidels for God while trying to protect the
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Christians who lived there seemed to be the ultimate objectives of the church and appeared as
shared objectives throughout the crusade among the different groups. Even through the three
periods of the crusade these ultimate objectives were never forgotten, the means to the end
and the prevailing goals that were sought fluctuated in accordance with whom was controlling
the crusade.
The leadership transitions in this period are not only between groups, such as the pope
and the crusading host, but also within groups as well, in particular within the crusading host
itself. When the first powerful lords took up the cross at the tournament at Ecry in 1199 a
leader for the crusade host emerged: Count Thibaut of Champagne.65 Since there is no
evidence of the beliefs or goal of Thibaut, all that can be said with accuracy is that he joined the
crusade early on and was chosen as its leader by his fellow nobles.66 However, Thibault died
shortly after becoming the leader and was replaced by Boniface of Montferrat in 1201. 67 The
goals of Boniface at this point are also uncertain due to the lack of evidence; however, he was
proposed by Villehardouin. 68 As evidenced by elections the leadership of the crusade within the
first two years was already shifting hands but these leadership transitions do not appear to
alter the course of the crusade as much as future ones tended to do.

Villehardouin, Chronicle, 3.
Ibid.
67
Bird, Peters, and Powell, Crusade, 48.
68
Villehardouin, Chronicle, 12; Boniface was one of the most accomplished men of the time, and a renowned
soldier. His family was a family of Crusaders. Boniface himself had even fought Saladin, was made prisoner, and
afterwards liberated because of a prisoner exchange. According to Frank Marzials an editor of Chronicle of The
Fourth Crusade and The Conquest of Constantinople and M. Emile Bouchet “(i)t was no mean and nameless knight
that Villehardouin was proposing as chief to the assembled Crusaders, but a princely noble, the patron of poets,
versed in state affairs, and possessing personal experience of Eastern warfare;” Villehardouin, Chronicle, 12.
65
66

20

The ever present dynamic of the pope’s influence from Rome and the belief of some
leaders and common soldiers alike that the pope had to sanction the actions of the crusaders
becomes apparent in this period and also foreshadows the upcoming conflict between some of
the leaders of the crusade and Innocent III. Evidence of this dynamic in this period was
illustrated by the crusaders presenting Innocent with the contract with the Venetians in order
to get his approval.69 This shows that approval of Innocent III was at least sought at the
beginning of the crusade and he had the power to make the agreement with the Venetians
official by ratifying it. This dynamic of seeking the approval of the pope continued throughout
the rest of the crusade and became very apparent in future periods, such as before the attack
on Zara and during the discussion whether or not to aid Alexius IV. However, as the crusade
progressed, it can be argued that the military and religious leaders in the field were the ones
who seemed to be making the decisions without directly consulting the pope. This became
clearer later on in the crusade but it is important to note that once the pope called the crusade
and sent out representatives to preach and recruit for it his influence was not felt as much as
that of the actual people who were physically leading the crusade.
In this first period there is one overwhelmingly evident event that would end up
dictating the future of the crusade: the treaty with Venice. While it is impossible to say what
would have happened if this treaty never been ratified or was different, it can be said that the
conditions imposed on the crusaders in this treaty resulted in a major leadership struggle as
well as a moral and ethical struggle among the crusaders in future periods of the crusade. Some
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modern scholars, such as Donald Queller, Thomas Compton, and Donald Campbell who attempt
to explain the crusade pinpoint the treaty as a decisive event that had major repercussions
throughout the remainder of the crusade.70

Chapter 4: The Second Period
This period is when the Fourth Crusade was first diverted and many internal struggles
and leadership transitions occurred. The second period also contains one of the most important
events in the Fourth Crusade: the attack on Zara. This period, along with the final period, truly
demonstrate the effects and repercussions of the multitude of leadership transitions and
internal dynamic shifts that this study claims are partially responsible for both the diversion and
failure of the Fourth Crusade. Therefore, understanding the events of the second period is
crucial if a greater understanding of the overall course of the crusade and the implications of
leadership transitions and internal dynamics are to be more fully realized.
The second period begins with a major moral crisis for the crusaders in the form of an
ultimatum given to them because of their inability to fully repay the Venetians. 71 According to
Robert of Clari, there was both a secret and public agreement between the Venetians and the
crusading army. 72 Publicly the Venetians promised to postpone the debt of the crusaders as
long as they promised to pay the remaining 36,000 marks from the first conquests of the
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crusade. 73 The Venetians also joined the crusade with a large army and demanded to be given
half of all that was conquered on the crusade.74 According Clari, the crusaders were very
grateful and eagerly accepted this compromise; however, the secret agreement to attack Zara
caused much division within the crusading leadership. 75
The Venetians spun the attack on Zara as the crusaders helping the Venetians to regain
territory that was rightfully theirs. According to Villehardouin, the Venetians told the crusaders
that the King of Hungary took from them Zara in Slavonia and that they could not retake it
without their help.76 According to Villehardouin, the decision to help the Venetians retake Zara
was not unanimous within the crusading leadership. 77 Nevertheless, the Venetians and
crusaders prepared to sail to Zara, and many Venetians, including the doge, took the cross and
officially joined the crusade. 78
The crusade was now diverted to Zara and at this point major moral and ethical
struggles began to afflict the crusading host. The crusaders finally set out from Venice in early
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November and arrived at Zara November 10, 1202 A.D.79 On November 12, 1202, a delegation
from Zara approached the doge and offered to surrender as long as the lives of the people in
Zara were spared. 80 The doge convened with other crusader leaders because he seemingly
wanted their approval or wanted to appease the crusaders by asking their opinion.81 The
crusaders agreed to the terms of the surrender; however, a force within the crusade incited the
people of Zara to fight and not surrender, according to Villehardouin. 82 When the doge
discovered this subversion by a force within the crusading party, he demanded that the
crusaders still help him take the city as they had promised. 83 This was a difficult proposition
because Zara was a Christian city and was under the protection of Innocent III, but the doge did
not believe that this protection was legitimate.84
While the Venetian leadership seemed to be confident that they were justified in
attacking Zara, the crusaders were not, and a schism began to appear between two major
beliefs in the crusading army. One group seemed to believe that the ends justified the means
and the other group seemed to believe the opposite and that the crusaders should go straight
to the Holy Land. The Abbot of Vaux, a papal delegate and an advocate of the beliefs of the
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second group, forbade the attack on Zara on the grounds that they were pilgrims and the city
was full of Christians. 85 Despite this warning, the crusaders capitulated to the demands of the
doge because they were in his debt, and the people who believed the ends justify the means
would have been shamed if they failed to complete what they promised and were unable to
reach the Holy Land. 86 Villehardouin, being a leader and the source that reports this sense of
shame, may have felt shame and responsibility for the situation the crusaders were put in by
the treaty he negotiated. While it is not possible to know for certain how Villehardouin felt, it is
clear that there was some sense of obligation to the Venetians either because of this shame or
perhaps stemming from a belief that if the crusaders helped the Venetians they would be able
to continue on to the Holy Land and fulfill their crusading vows. Nevertheless, the crusading
army attacked the Christian city of Zara, which surrendered after five days of fighting, and the
crusaders remained there until spring of the following year. 87 This marks the end of the second
partition of the crusade.
During the second period the first major change of influence and power occurred when
the crusaders deferred control to the Venetians, failed to fulfill the treaty, and agreed to help
the Venetians attack Zara. In this period the Venetians also take the cross and become
crusaders. 88 In this period Innocent III also begins to lose what control he has over the crusade
as evidenced by the crusaders and Venetians going through with the attack on Zara despite him

Villehardouin, Chronicle, 21.
Ibid.
87
Ibid, 22; Ibid, 25.
88
From this point forward, the Venetian crusaders will be referred to as the Venetians and the Non-Venetian
crusaders will be referred to as the crusaders. This is semantic in nature only as both groups are crusaders during
the Fourth Crusade.
85
86

25

warning them not to and, according to Madden, threatening them with excommunication.89
The crusade would continue to experience these leadership transitions and internal dynamic
shifts throughout the third and final period.

Chapter 5: Analysis of the Second Period
In the second period it becomes apparent that different leaders were willing to accept
different means to a desired end. This is a recurring internal dynamic that is present throughout
much of the second and third period of this crusade and often comes to the surface during
periods of moral crisis such as the deliberation whether or not to attack the Christian city of
Zara. This period also makes evident more dissent within the crusading host based upon the
beliefs and goals of groups involved. Analyzing both the actions and reactions of groups in this
period provides more insight into the crusade and shows that events in this period were the
result of the failure of the crusaders to fulfill the treaty and the ensuing leadership change that
occurred when the crusaders attempted to rectify the situation by making a new deal with
Venetians.
This second phase of the crusade is when outside forces begin to steer the crusade in
the direction they want. 90 The Venetians sacrificed much in order to complete their part of the
treaty so it is understandable why they wanted to hold the crusaders completely accountable
for what they agreed to. The Venetians postponed their entire maritime economy for a year
and a half in order to complete their part of the treaty and they only received a small payment
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in advance. 91 This postponing of the maritime economy was all the more important because
the Venetians relied upon trade and maritime commerce to supply their city and since much of
their wealth came from trade the Venetians were lacking a large amount of money that they
would had otherwise gained from such commerce. 92
The Venetians needed to make a decision about how to rectify the situation but also
needed to be careful not to make a decision that would not hurt their interests. The Venetians
could have made the crusaders sign a new contract agreeing to pay the remainder of the debt
within a certain period of time but that was risky and the crusaders had already failed to pay
once. The Venetians seemed to have considered keeping the money that was collected from
the crusaders and since it was not enough to fulfill the contract just tell the crusaders to
leave. 93 However, according to Elizabeth Horodowich, the Venetians were used to failed
contracts and used this experience to devise a plan to both benefit themselves further and
allow the crusaders to continue on their crusade.94 Horodowich believes that the Venetians
agreed to transport the crusaders in return for capturing several cities in Adriatic Sea, including
Zara, to help shore up Venice’s strength and hold on their trading routes.95 With the evidence
presented by Horodowich and Villehardouin it seems that the Venetians decided upon this
solution in order to appease their own people who still were owed money from the crusaders
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and to perhaps protect their reputation from being tarnished, which could have a devastating
impact on their trade empire. 96
This new arrangement between the Venetian crusaders and the non-Venetian crusaders
drastically shifted the control and power of the crusade into the hands of the Venetians. The
crusaders agreed to help the Venetians retake Zara and also to give fifty percent of all
conquests to the Venetians. The crusaders were in effect following orders of the Venetians not
only to repay a debt but in order to reach the Holy Land and fulfill their crusading oaths. This
represents the first major leadership transition of the crusade, which occurred between rather
than within groups.
The Venetians claimed that it was justified to attack the city of Zara because they were
rebellious and according to just war theory of the time they were right in doing so, according to
an analysis of Gunther of Pairis’ work explored by Raymond Schmandt.97 According to the
translated work of Gunther, some crusaders decided that committing small acts of evil in order
to accomplish the greater holy work of the crusade was justified. 98 However, there was still
great debate among the crusaders as to whether or not this was justified. Many crusaders left
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the crusade because they felt that it was not going in a direction they could morally support. 99
The Abbot of Vaux along with another opposition leader, Simon de Montfort, read a papal
letter stating that the crusaders would be excommunicated if they attacked the city. Thus,
Simon de Montfort left the crusade with as many as would follow him to find another way to
the Holy Land. 100 The crusade was far from over since many men remained and carried out the
attack on Zara, thus gaining military victory but also facing excommunication.
It is very important to try to determine why, at this point in time, so many crusaders
decided that even though their actions could result in excommunication, they still pursued the
current plan as it was their best chance of reaching the Holy Land. From what can be gathered,
the crusaders who stayed most likely believed the ends justified the means. If this belief is
accurate, perhaps the crusaders believed that by attacking Zara they would be able to
eventually achieve their ultimate objective of liberating the Holy Land. The crusading leaders
who carried out the attack and stayed with the crusade may have, on some level, believed the
ends justified the means; otherwise, they most likely would have deserted along with the
others who didn’t believe in attacking Christian cities and wanted to go directly to the Holy
Land. 101 The Venetians were very careful in defending why they attacked Zara and if the letter
of Doge Dandolo to Innocent III previously discussed is any indication, the Venetians seemed
compelled to defend the attack on Zara as justified — not on the basis of religion but rather as
seeking vengeance for rebellion in which Venice would be justified to retaliate.
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It seems very likely that not all soldiers were made aware of the consequences of their
actions and, according to Madden, many soldiers, especially the Venetians, still believed they
were receiving direct orders from Innocent III. 102 This belief along with the feeling that they
must obey the commands of the pope may have contributed to support for the attack on Zara
as well. 103 An excellent example of the soldiers not knowing the true consequences of their
actions or even the origin of their orders is when the crusaders and Venetians were
excommunicated, only a few of the leaders knew about it and this was kept hidden from the
vast majority of the army. 104 While this does seem to be a way for the crusading leaders to
maintain control over and even manipulate their soldiers to do what they want, it also seems
that they believed the ends justified the means and that the ordinary soldier had no need to
know what was truly going on as long as they fulfilled their crusading oaths. According to
Madden, the leadership must have been fearful for the continuity of the crusade if this
information was leaked to the army, and they feared this for good reason. Many soldiers had
already left due to moral disagreements and if they had learned they were excommunicated,
they might have given up. 105 This fear of excommunication leading to the disintegration of the
army was mentioned by Doge Dandolo to Boniface of Montferrat who, in turn, relayed this
information to Innocent III in a letter. 106 This fear of excommunication and of incurring the
wrath of the church for diverting the crusade seems to have be shared by both the Venetians,
as evidenced by the above letter, and by the crusaders, as evidenced by the various debates
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and discussions among the crusading leadership about the diversions to Zara and, in the next
period, to Constantinople.
The reins of the crusade had passed from the crusaders into the hands of the Venetians
and the doge. This had disastrous moral and religious consequences for those crusaders who
stayed. However, it is important to note that after the conquest of Zara there were no plans to
attack any other Christian cities, according to the account of Villehardouin, and the agreement
struck with the crusaders after they failed to meet the conditions of the treaty. The crusaders
and Venetians were to remain in Zara for the winter and then in spring head to the Holy Land,
according to Villehardouin. 107 It is important to note that the ultimate objective still appears to
be the retaking of the Holy Land, but what we see from the Venetian leadership is the crusading
host is being asked to achieve this goal through means that are not entirely religious and are
definitely not entirely approved by the originator of the crusade, Innocent III.
The shift of the leadership gives us some insight into what was most important to
certain groups during this second period. The first group, the newly ascendant Venetian
leadership, under the doge, had several objectives that don’t necessarily reconcile with one
another unless we see the crusade from their perspective. The Venetians seem to have had a
blend of monetary and religious motivations, which have raised many questions from scholars
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as evidenced by the debate that Madden recorded in this work, “Outside and Inside the Fourth
Crusade” about their real intentions in joining the crusade.108
This uncertainty of what the Venetians’ true motivations were has, perhaps
unjustifiably, led to conspiracy theories about the Venetians purposefully diverting the crusade
for revenge.109 This Venetian diversion theory has existed since the time of the Fourth Crusade
and has seemingly evolved as time has gone on. Nicetas Choniates, a Byzantine historian who
documented the Fourth Crusade in his Historia, claimed that the doge of Venice used the
crusade for his secret plan to trick others into destroying Byzantium. 110 A modern version of
this theory is that the Venetians took advantage of the crusaders being unable to fulfill their
debts and in turn used this debt to drive the crusade to secure their control of the sea for trade
and to eliminate a major competitor, Byzantium.111 While there is still some support for the
Venetian diversion theory as evidenced by the work of Madden and, to a lesser extent,
Horodowich, this theory is not supported by the evidence gathered from this study. 112
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However, even though there were cases in which the leadership of the crusade switched hands,
the ultimate objective always appeared to be the retaking of the Holy Land. The means and the
secondary objectives are the ones that tended to shift.
One of the main goals of the Venetians at this point was to secure repayment for their
treaty with the crusaders. This is evident in both the accounts of Villehardouin and Clari when
they only allow the crusaders to leave port when they agree to repay them through conquest
and they had previously also agreed to split what they conquer with the Venetians. 113 This
doesn’t mean the Venetians were solely in the crusade for the profit. Making sure they were
repaid and protecting their reputation as a maritime power dependent upon trade possibly had
an impact upon their decisions as well. However, it would be incorrect to say that the
Venetians had solely secular motivations for the crusade.
The second main goal of the Venetians, and still the ultimate objective, was to help
retake the Holy Land for God. The Venetians had a past of serving and supporting the crusades
and the pope, and this could be seen as a continuation of that service and support. 114 The
Venetians were a religious people as evidenced by their devotion to Christianity and Christian
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saints, such as Saint Mark, and previous involvement in crusades.115 This support of Christianity
and seemingly well intentioned prior involvement in the crusades does provide some evidence
as to why the Venetians only directed the crusade to Zara after the crusaders failed to pay their
debt and the Venetians had to make a new arrangement and the fact that there is no evidence
of this being a plan prior to the crusader’s failure to pay. This would also help to explain why
the Venetians did not state any plans to attack other Christian cities in this period, thus
invalidating the claim of a Venetian hijacking of the crusade for their own purposes. It could
even be argued, based upon the evidence provided by Thomas Madden, that the majority of
Venetians in the crusade never believed that they were acting in a way that would be against
their faith, the direction of the crusade, or Innocent III. 116 In addition, many of the ordinary
soldiers and men not in high leadership positions believed that they were following the direct
orders of Innocent III, according to Boniface of Montferrat. 117
In this period there is a dichotomy of beliefs among the crusading leadership, especially
in their ideas of what is an acceptable means to the end of reaching and liberating the Holy
Land. There seem to be two major groups within the crusading party. One group was more apt
to accept extreme means, such as attacking Christians, in order to achieve the desired goal. The
other group was much less likely to accept extreme means and its ideals seem more similar to
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those of Innocent III than of the first group. It is important to examine these two groups closely
in order to better understand how and why the crusade was ultimately diverted.
The first group, which did not believe the means of attacking Christians justified the
ends, appears to have similar ideals to that of the crusade’s spiritual leader, Innocent III. Some
evidence to support this lies in the fact that this group openly supported and preached the
desires of Innocent III to the rest of the crusaders in order to try and convince them that they
should follow the orders of their pope.118 This group had many high ranking members of the
crusade and the main conservative leaders were the Abbot of Vaux and Simon de Montfort.
This group is regularly referred by Villehardouin to as “those who wished that the host should
be broken up” or some version of that.119 This perhaps alludes to the obstructive stance they
took with regard to the diversion of the crusade and attacking Christians and their opposition to
the Venetians and the party that favored drastic means to get to the desired end. Therefore, it
would seem that Villehardouin is distorting the truth just enough to make it misleading. It
seems likely that the group he is describing wanted to go directly to the Holy Land and to stop
diverting the crusade. Perhaps in his mind the dissenters were trying to break up the crusade
when in reality they were trying to save it from its own diversions and missteps.
This group seemed to have a consistent policy during the crusade. They seem to believe
that attacking Christians was taboo as we saw in their opposition to attacking Zara and as we
will continue to see throughout the remainder of the crusade. 120 A great example of some
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members of this group stating this belief is when the Abbot of Vaux preached that attacking
Christians during a crusade was wrong and Robert of Boves even told the Zarans that the
crusaders would not attack them because they were Christian.121 Another strong belief of this
group of crusaders was that they should not waste time and should immediately go to the Holy
Land to fight for God and fulfill their crusading vows. This belief is evidenced by this group of
crusaders not supporting the change of plans to divert to Zara. 122 Further evidence of this
occurs in the next part of the crusade when the crusaders are presented with a proposal by
Alexius IV of Byzantium. 123 As has been alluded to above, there is a continuation of these
beliefs in the next period of the crusade and some of this group tries to separate themselves
from what they deemed as a crusade that was no longer in accordance with the wishes of the
pope.
The second group of crusaders had a much more complex view of what was right and
wrong for the crusade and perhaps showed a more practical approach to the conundrum that
faced them. The main leaders of the crusade who seemed to share this ideology were
Villehardouin, Marquis of Montferrat, Baldwin Count of Flanders, and the Abbot of Loos. Even
though this group shared the same ultimate goal as the other group, that does not become
readily evident until the next period. This is evidenced by the crusaders helping to settle their
debt with the Venetians so that they could continue on to the Holy Land and by some of the
leaders claiming that this was their best chance of accomplishing their mission. This group also
recognized that in order to achieve this goal they would need to use extreme measures such as
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attacking a Christian city. The members of this group supported the attack on the city and
justified it as keeping the host together and fulfilling the treaty that they had originally failed to
uphold.124 These extreme measures, however, were often not in line with the views of the
church and Innocent III and led to conflict that resulted in the crusade being excommunicated
multiple times, the first being after the attack on the city of Zara. 125
This group supported the attack on Zara as a way to repay the Venetians and seemed to
believe that helping the Venetians and resolving their debt was a way to avoid the shame and
dishonor of failing to complete their treaty. Clari wrote that he believed the Venetians felt that
the crusaders were shameful for not doing what they promised.126 Perhaps the crusaders
agreed to the new proposal out of shame for failing to live up the original proposal. According
to Villehardouin, the crusaders attacked Zara because it was all they could to try to hold the
crusade together. 127
The belief that diverting the crusade was the best option to ultimately complete their
goals occurs in the third partition of the crusade when the crusaders once again reach a point
of contention over a perceived diversion of the crusade. It is important to note that this group
did not include a majority of the rank and file soldiers who tended to have a view more similar
to the first group of crusaders and seemed less likely to support extreme measures.128 The idea
of the normal rank and file having this mindset comes from the letters of Boniface of
Montferrat discussed above. Therefore, the crusade leadership understood that the rank and
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file were of this mindset and as the crusade proceeded they seemed to become increasingly
more secretive about specific crusading details and even hid from the soldiers that they were
excommunicated by the pope after attacking Zara. 129
During this period we begin to see a very distinct difference between two divergent
groups within the crusade but we also see the steady and consistent policy and belief of
Innocent III. During this period, he had no change of policy regarding the crusade and what he
considered acceptable means to accomplish his plan. Innocent III excommunicated the entire
crusading host for going against his wishes, a policy that shows how upset he was by the
crusaders’ actions. 130 According to Villehardouin, Innocent III pardoned the crusaders for their
attack on Zara because he believed that they were compelled by others to attack Zara and
acknowledged that the crusading host must be held together in order to retake the Holy
Land. 131 It is important to note that even though Innocent III pardoned the crusaders within a
few months of excommunicating them in 1202, he purposefully didn’t pardon the Venetians
whom he may have believed to have been behind the diversion that resulted in the attack on
Zara and the ones who impelled the crusaders to attack. 132 While this may not be entirely
accurate, it would explain why the crusaders and not the Venetians were pardoned. With the
information provided by Madden, such as the doge informing Innocent III that if the Venetians
knew of their excommunication they would turn home, it would seem likely that Innocent knew
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that the host must remain together in order to achieve his ultimate goal of recovering the Holy
Land. 133 Therefore, it seems that he told the crusaders to do what they could to hold the host
together in the hopes of being able to retake Jerusalem; this seems to be the main motivation
for Innocent pardoning the crusaders.134
The second period, even though it did not span a great deal of time, contained many
important internal dynamics shifts and a major leadership transition. The third period
continued the trend of internal dynamic changes and leadership shifts and the ascendancy of
the Venetians as a major contributor and influencer of the crusade. While the second period
does seem to have one of the most important events during the Fourth Crusade with regard to
its diversion and ultimate failure, the attack on Zara, the final period is also extremely
important in understanding the issues this thesis tries to address.

Chapter 6: The Third Period
The third part of the crusade begins with the crusading party wintering in Zara.
However, there are two different versions of what exactly happened while wintering in Zara —
one from Clari and the other from Villehardouin — which alter perceptions of the events that
follow significantly. Both accounts provide valuable insight into the crusade and offer
contrasting views that are hard to reconcile with one another. Therefore, one version is
ultimately given more credence and used in this study as the source for this period.
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If the version of Villehardouin is to be believed, the third period began when the
crusaders received messengers with a proposal from Alexius IV and King Phillip of Germany
while they were wintering in Zara. According to Alexius and Phillip, if the crusaders were to help
bring Alexius justice by helping him retake Constantinople — which to Alexius believed was
rightfully his — then the crusaders would receive a great reward that would be ultimately
beneficial to their quest for retaking the Holy Land. 135 According to the proposal, Alexius would
reunite the Byzantine church with that of the West and would be obedient to Rome. Alexius
would also offer 200,000 silver marks along with provisions for the crusading army. 136 He also
offered to send 10,000 soldiers with the crusade to fight in the Holy Land for a year and
maintain 500 knights in the defense of the Holy Land for his lifetime.137
The crusading party was deeply divided and had a great debate over the proposal.138
This dichotomy of the crusading party continued into the third period and remained throughout
a majority of that time. One group of crusaders wanted nothing to do with the proposal while
the other major group felt it gave them a better chance to retake the Holy Land. 139 Once again,
after much debate, some of the group agreed to the proposal and the Marquis of Montferrat,
Baldwin Count of Flanders and Hainault, Count Louis, Count Hugh of St. Paul and eight other
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men of importance entered into the covenant with Alexius.140 This agreement, according to
Villehardouin, was not supported by the other group of crusaders who did not favor attacking
Christians or diverting the crusade. 141 This group advocated to reject the new compact with
Alexius and supported sailing straight to the Holy Land. 142
The struggle between the two groups within the crusading host had reached critical
levels. Villehardouin writes that many crusaders abandoned the crusade and tried to go home
or to the Holy Land without the rest of the army.143 Despite this, the crusaders still had enough
men to go forward with their new plans of helping to retake Constantinople for Alexius, and
once Alexius arrived in Zara in April 1203, the host departed for Corfu but not before leveling
the city of Zara. 144
If we are to believe Clari a very different scenario unfolded. According to him, after the
crusaders had conquered Zara they were out of money and provisions and were unable to
complete their journey to the Holy Land.145 Clari even goes as far as to say that even if they did
go to the Holy Land, they would not have the means to accomplish anything. 146 Clari also writes
140
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that the doge realized this and thus proposed to the host: “Sirs, Greece is a very rich land, and
bountifully supplied with everything. If we can find a sufficient excuse for going there and
taking food and other things, so as to recuperate ourselves, it would seem to me advisable, and
then we could easily go across the sea." 147 Boniface of Montferrat, the leader of the crusaders,
then stated that he knew of Alexius IV who was a victim of treason and had lost Constantinople
to traitors. 148 He goes on to suggest that they get him to join them and take him to
Constantinople not only because he is the rightful heir, but also because they would be able to
resupply there and continue on the crusade.149
The theme of dissention is consistent between the accounts of Clari and Villehardouin.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that once Alexius arrived at Zara the crusaders convened to
discuss what to do since there was discontent brewing. One group claimed that they now had
an excuse to go to Constantinople since they had the lawful heir with them. 150 However, the
other group dissented, saying that they should make for the Holy Land since they only had
about six months left on their contract with the Venetians who were providing their
transportation. 151 The one group in support of Alexius responded by saying that they didn’t
have enough money or provisions to go and would die of hunger if they attempted a journey to
the Holy Land right away. 152 This same group claimed it would be acceptable for them to attack
Constantinople because they would be helping a wronged leader and would be gaining support
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and provisions from Alexius once he regained power. 153 According to Clari, the Marquis of
Montferrat did everything he could to get the crusaders to go to Constantinople because he
wanted revenge for an unnamed wrong that the usurper had done to him. 154
While Clari’s version is certainly interesting, the account of Villehardouin seems to be
more reliable because he was in a position of leadership and thus more likely to be privy to the
reality of the situation. Whether or not Villehardouin presents the situation accurately or
truthfully is not fully known. 155 This isn’t to say that Clari’s version is a lie. It may or may not be
true, but it provides a different perspective and perhaps relays different information than the
account of Villehardouin alone would, including which party initiated dialogue with respect to
helping Alexius IV retake Byzantium. This dichotomy of accounts creates many issues with
studying the Fourth Crusade because it relies upon the reader to try to decipher the truth from
the bias and deception. This is further complicated by the extreme bias that is seemingly in all
the major primary sources for this crusade.
Despite the differences between the two accounts, we do know that Alexius joined the
crusaders at Zara and after debate some of the crusaders left the host while those who
remained journeyed to Corfu.156 Among the crusaders who left were many notable leaders,
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such as Simon of Montfort and the Abbot of Vaux, who were very much opposed to the current
diversion and attacking of Christians.157 This group decided to leave the host and join with the
King of Hungary, the previous ruler of Zara. 158
The threat of desertions would follow the crusader host to Corfu where they managed
to capture the city of Duras, but another group of crusaders gathered together and sought to
abandon the crusade.159 This time, according to Villehardouin, over half the remaining host
sought to abandon the crusade.160 The Marquis of Montferrat and his followers were distraught
at this realization and knew that if they did not reconcile the other group that the crusade
would fall apart and fail. 161 Therefore, this group of crusaders decided to approach those who
were discontent and make a promise to them: If the discontents would remain with the host for
six months, they would provide transport for anyone discontent with the direction of the
crusade to the Holy Land after that time.162 Both parties accepted this compromise and another
disaster was avoided by the crusading host.
With the host newly reunited they soon set sail for Constantinople in order to reinstall
Alexius. Along the way the crusaders captured the cities of Abydos and Andros. According to
Horodowich, the Venetians wanted these cities dealt with in order to shore up control of their
Adriatic trade routes. 163 After these conquests the host continued to the city of Constantinople,
stopping at the Abbey of St. Stephen, three leagues from Constantinople, in order to formulate
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a plan. 164 The crusaders decided to raid the nearby islands before approaching the city of
Constantinople with Alexius. 165 When the crusaders reached the city, they paraded Alexius in
front of the walls and announced to the people of Constantinople that he was their true lord
and if they accepted him as such they wouldn’t be harmed.166 However, the people of
Constantinople didn’t recognize Alexius as their ruler so the crusaders prepared for battle. 167
Battle ensued for the next few days until one night, the usurper that ruled Constantinople,
Alexius III, fled from Constantinople. 168 The late night retreat resulted in some leaders within
the city of Constantinople releasing the father of Alexius IV, Isaac, and reinstalling him as ruler
of Constantinople.169
With Alexius III driven from the city and Isaac II, father of Alexius IV, reinstalled the
crusade finally seemed like it would soon be in the Holy Land. The crusaders sent envoys —
Villehardouin among them — to Isaac II in order to discuss the terms established by Alexius IV
with the crusaders and the treaty was ratified by Isaac. 170 According to Villehardouin, the terms
that were presented to Isaac were as follows:
In the first place to put the whole empire of Roumania in obedience to Rome, from which
it has been separated this long while; further to give 200,000 marks of silver to those of
the host, with food for one year for small and great; to send 10,000 men, horse and foot
- many on foot as we shall devise and as many mounted - in his own ships, and at his own
charges, to the land of Babylon, and keep them there for a year; and during his lifetime
to keep, at his own charges, five hundred knights in the land overseas so that they may
guard that land.171
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It is important to note that even though Isaac said that these conditions would be difficult to
fulfill he still confirmed the agreement and thus the crusaders allowed Alexius to return to his
father, if we are to believe the account of Villehardouin. 172 At this point, according to Robert of
Clari, Alexius demanded that he be crowned emperor before he began making payments to the
crusaders. 173 On August 1, a few weeks after the crusaders had returned Alexius to
Constantinople, he was coroneted as emperor of Constantinople.174
With Constantinople subjugated and Alexius in power the crusaders appeared to be a
short time away from liberating the Holy Land; however, issues quickly arose that would lead to
the eventual failure of the crusade. According to Villehardouin, shortly after Alexius gained power
he began fulfilling his part of the deal with the crusaders by beginning the payments to
crusaders. 175 Clari states that Alexius paid 100,000 marks, which is half of what he promised, and
this was spilt evenly between the crusaders and the Venetians. 176 This was the point in the
crusade when the crusaders finally paid off their remaining original debt of 36,000 marks to the
Venetians.177
Although Alexius had begun payment to the crusaders, he realized that he would be
unable to fully pay them unless they remained at Constantinople for an extended period of time,
according to Villehardouin. 178 Alexius also realized that he was hated for allying himself with the
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crusaders, and if the crusaders left, he would be unable to pay them because he might be
killed. 179 In return for this further delay from the mission of the crusade, Alexius promised to pay
for the retention of the Venetian forces for another year as long as they supplied the crusaders.180
The reasoning provided by Alexius, according to Villehardouin, was that this extension would
allow him to strengthen his hold on the government and would give him enough time to prepare
troops to send with the crusade and pay the crusaders what was owed to them as per their
agreement. 181
Although this plan seemed reasonable according to Villehardouin, the leaders decided to
present this proposition before the entire crusading host and make a decision based upon what
the group wanted. 182 Once again there was great debate among the crusaders who proposed to
delay the crusade. Another group of crusaders was deeply upset with the proposal to delay the
crusade. 183 They wanted to abandon the crusade but were eventually dissuaded by the efforts of
the group of crusaders who had been trying to hold the crusade together with the offer of Alexius
to retain the services of the Venetians for several more months. 184
While this does seem plausible, Clari presents Alexius in a much different light. He writes
that Alexius, when approached by messengers of the crusaders seeking the rest of the
payment, refused to pay any more than the 100,000 marks and wanted the crusaders gone
from his land.185 This is in stark contrast to the pleading of Alexius for the crusaders to stay,
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which Villehardouin reports. Clari even goes as far as to say that Alexius threatened the
crusaders with war if they did not leave and that he would not keep his deal with them. 186
Villehardouin eventually seems to realize, along with the remaining crusaders, that
Alexius is using delay tactics to complete his promise. Villehardouin was chosen as one of the
envoys sent to Alexius to give him an ultimatum: either pay what is due or the crusaders will
seize what they believed to be rightfully theirs. 187 Alexius responded angrily and both sides
prepared for war. 188
At this point the Byzantines seemed to no longer require Alexius since their ties with the
crusaders were now meaningless. Therefore, a coup occurred in which Alexius and his father
were both murdered and Mourzuphles was made the new emperor.189 This act may have
doomed the Byzantine Empire. This act of treachery toward Alexius seemed to give some
crusaders, who had doubts about attacking Christians, a justified reason to attack: avenging
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regicide. 190 Villehardouin described the crusaders’ and clergies’ reactions to this news as
follows:
And all the clergy, including those who had powers from the Pope, showed to the
barons and to the pilgrims that any one guilty of such a murder had no right to hold
lands, and that those who consented thereto were abettors of the murder; and beyond
all this, that the Greeks had withdrawn themselves from obedience to Rome.
‘"Wherefore we tell you,"’ said the clergy, "’ that this war is lawful and just, and that if
you have a right intention in conquering this land, to bring it into the Roman obedience,
all those who die after confession shall have part in the indulgence granted by the
Pope."’ And you must know that by this the barons and pilgrims were greatly
comforted.191
Thus, according to Villehardouin, it appears the Byzantines inadvertently doomed themselves
by committing regicide and refusing to hold up their end of the agreement. The Byzantines gave
the crusaders a just reason — according to the crusaders — to attack Constantinople.
Therefore, this attack on a Christian city seemed to have met less opposition from the
crusaders than the previous attack on Zara and was not a major moral conflict like the attack on
Zara or the aiding of Alexius IV.
Raymond Schmandt believes that the account of Villehardouin is accurate in its stating
that the crusaders felt their actions to be justified. Schmandt uses the accounts of
Villehardouin, Clari, and Gunther along with his knowledge of medieval just-war theory to break
down the crusaders’ justification to attack into three key moral and religious components.192
First, Schmandt primarily uses the work of Gunther to support the claim that the crusaders saw
attacking Constantinople as self-defense. 193
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According to Schmandt’s translation of Gunther, because the crusaders felt isolated and
threatened by Alexius IV and Isaac II and they had no place of refuge, they were at the mercy of
the Byzantines.194 Second, citing both Clari and Villehardouin, Schmandt claims that since the
crusaders had fulfilled their end of the bargain and were being betrayed by Alexius IV, they
justifiably sought revenge for a wrong. 195 Schmandt also claims that the crusaders were
particularly horrified by the regicide committed by the Byzantines and used that as justification
for attacking Constantinople.196 Finally, Schmandt claims that repairing the schism between the
eastern and western churches may have played a role by helping to justify attacking those who
were not obedient to the law of Rome and the pope. 197 Therefore, it seems the ends justifying
the means was still present and that the crusaders, according to the accounts of Villehardouin,
Clari, and Gunther along with the analysis of Schmandt, believed they had justified reasons to
attack Constantinople.
With justifications for their impending assault, the crusaders devised both a military
strategy for attacking the city and planned what they would do when they captured the city.
The crusaders and Venetians agreed to divide the city and spoils in half and that a panel of six
crusaders and six Venetians would elect the next emperor. With justification and plans in order,
the army attacked Constantinople and after being repulsed once captured the city and forced
Mourzuphles to flee. 198 The plan of dividing the spoils and city between the crusaders and
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Venetians was followed for the most part, with Villehardouin stating that some covetous
people took more than they should.199
The last part of the crusade that this study examine is the election of the new emperor
of Constantinople. Six Venetians and six crusaders deliberated and elected a new emperor.
According to Villehardouin, the decision was between the leader of the crusade, Boniface of
Montferrat, and Count Baldwin of Flanders and Hainault. 200 After deliberation, the latter was
chosen and was coroneted within three weeks. 201
With this election and capture of Constantinople, the main driving force of the crusade
seemed to halt. This study is considers this to be the end of the crusade because at this point
the host becomes severely splintered by the conquest and the ensuing occupation and
protection of the land. However, some crusaders did continue to the Holy Land. Some, such as
Henry, the brother of the new emperor, even managed to capture some territory but had very
limited military power, which led to very little overall success. 202 This lack of military power can
be attributed to both the occupation of Byzantium and the resulting infighting between the
crusaders struggling to capture their own pieces of territory in what was previously Greek
Byzantium. Evidence of this infighting can be seen even between the new emperor and the
leader of the crusading host, Boniface of Montferrat, who came into conflict over the cities of
Demotica and Salonika. 203 Even though the ultimate objective of the crusade was never
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accomplished, many groups gained a lot from their participation. These gains and what they
meant for the respective groups will be examined in the following chapter.

Chapter 7: Analysis of the Third Period
The two different accounts by Villehardouin and Clari of the negotiation with Alexius at
the beginning of the third period set the tone for a period full of conflict, confusion, and
uncertainty. These accounts vary quite significantly if both sources are considered credible.
Therefore, it is important to analyze the differences of these accounts to determine what could
have happened and the reason for these differences.
Villehardouin claimed that Alexius IV approached the crusading force and offered a
great reward for assisting him in retaking what was rightfully his. This idea of justification
persisted throughout the chronicle written by Villehardouin. It seems that the crusaders
preferred having a just reason to have a reason for action, especially if that reason, such as
attacking a Christian city, was considered controversial. Therefore, this account can be
considered a continuation of a theme of trying to justify an action in order to lessen the blame
on Villehardouin. His account was written well after the conclusion of the crusade and has the
benefit of hindsight, which perhaps led him to write in a way that presented the crusade in a
more justified manner in order to deflect blame from himself for its failure or its wrongdoings.
However, it is still important to note that some crusaders, even with the justification, preferred
to abandon the host and go home or directly to the Holy Land instead of helping Alexius.
Clari generally agreed with Villehardouin regarding the discussion of whether or not to
accept the deal of Alexius, but their main difference centers on who initiated the dialogue
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between Alexius and the crusaders. While this may seem trivial, it is an important difference
that helps to illuminate an internal dynamic present throughout the crusade.
The differences between accounts begin when the leader of the crusade, Boniface of
Montferrat, says he saw a man in the court of Philip of Swabia who was the usurped emperor of
Byzantium and if they helped Philip to retake his land they would have a sufficient excuse to
go. 204 This account portrayed the crusaders as actively seeking a justified excuse to attack
Constantinople and represented the crusaders as less than honest and not as virtuous as the
Villehardouin’s account portrayed them. Clari reported that the crusaders appear to be using
the dethroned emperor as an excuse for attacking a rich and powerful city.
On the other hand, Villehardouin presents the crusaders as passive recipients of a plea
for help rather than active seekers of it. Villehardouin says that Alexius sent a message to the
crusaders asking for their help to retake what was rightfully his. Therefore, if the crusaders
decided to help they would justifiably be attacking a Christian city without actively seeking to
do so.
This is a small part of the crusade, but it has enormous weight in how the crusade is
viewed. Were the crusaders actively seeking ways to justify their desired actions? Clari would
have you believe so. Or was the crusade sought after in order to attain justice as Villehardouin
believed? Perhaps Clari was unaware of the reality of the situation and what he heard or
observed was not contextually accurate. Or, perhaps Villehardouin was once again trying to
deflect blame and criticism by portraying the crusaders as passive in this instance. While there
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is no sure answer, it is nonetheless important to understand that these differences highlight the
possible motives of both writers but, more importantly, they shed light on certain internal
dynamics within the crusade, such as need for justification of actions. The authors either
personally felt the need to justify the actions of the crusade or recorded that others sought
justification or believed they were justified in their actions.
During this period desertions by the group of crusaders who wanted to go directly to the
Holy Land became a very real threat to the host. This reinforces the idea of a dichotomy in the
crusade. One group wished to go directly to the Holy Land while another supported diverting
the crusade along the way to either resolve issues, such as attacking Zara to postpone payment
of debt, or to enhance their chances of success in the Holy Land, such as helping Alexius regain
his power and receive his support. Threats of desertion became actual acts of desertion several
times during this period, both at Zara and at Constantinople. This lack of resolve and cohesion
created many issues for the crusading leaders, and even though they made concessions to the
unhappy party, it appeared that the crusading leaders were losing some of their power over
their own army.
This third period is the part of the crusade which contained the most leadership
transitions. More importantly, this is the period in which the power and direction of the
crusade was temporarily altered by someone not even affiliated with the crusade, Alexius IV.
The previous groups — the crusaders, the Venetian crusaders, and the pope — also experience
a change in their power and influence throughout this period.
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In order to better analyze the different leadership changes, this study examines the
transitions by group rather than by chronological order and then analyzes the pattern of these
subsequent changes. This method of analysis gives a better perspective on how each individual
group’s influence shifts so that patterns emerge that can then be analyzed further. The
Venetians seemed to have the most influence on the crusade in the second period and their
influence continues throughout the third period but to a lesser extent. The doge of Venice was
always part of the decision-making process and whichever side he supported eventually won
out. The best example of this is when the doge supported the aiding of Alexius, which led to
some crusaders agreeing to help Alexius. 205
The Venetians were an integral part of the crusading force. However, during this period,
the influence of Alexius created a change in power within the crusade. After the agreement
with Alexius was made, the crusade was working for his goals. The fact that the crusaders
helped retake Constantinople affirmed the Alexius’ influence on the crusade. Because the goals
of Alexius IV had become a priority, the Venetians lost some of their influence but were still
very involved with the crusade through its end. Once the crusade turned to taking
Constantinople, the Venetians’ influence became more equal to that of the crusading force.
When they captured Constantinople, the groups divided both the territory and spoils evenly
between the two groups. 206 This equitable division showed that neither group was more
deserving than the other nor had more right to the land or spoils. This equality extended until
the end of the crusade when six crusaders and six Venetians chose the next emperor of
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Constantinople. Even though the emperor came from the crusading party, he was chosen by
both crusaders and Venetians, which supports the theory of equality of influence in the
decision. If the Venetians were adamantly opposed to a crusader as emperor, they could have
forced a stalemate with each side having six votes. However, this did not happen and the new
emperor was chosen unanimously by the delegates.
During this period the crusaders slowly gained some influence over the crusade and
regained some power at the expense of the Venetians. In the second period the crusaders were
at the whim of the Venetians; however the Venetians had less of a grip on the direction of the
crusade when the agreement with Alexius was struck. The crusaders had also fulfilled the first
part of their new agreement with the Venetians, the capture of Zara. This along with the deal
with Alexius gave the crusaders some power. It is likely that the Venetians did not have the
military power to capture Constantinople on their own and so needed the crusaders to
accomplish the reinstallation of Alexius IV. Since the crusaders still owed money to the
Venetians and represented a potent fighting force that was now required to storm a heavily
fortified city, it can be argued that this returned some power to the crusaders although they
still were not in a position of dominance over the Venetians. If anything, the crusaders had
risen to level terms with the Venetians during the final period, as evidenced by the equal
division of the captured Constantinople and equal representation in electing a new emperor.207
The crusaders gained some power in this period in a very unusual way. Ironically, the
thing that plagued the crusaders during this period as well as the second — the threat of
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desertion — also gave them some influence over the course of the crusade. At several points
during this period desertion threatened to end or further derail the crusade. There are two
major instances of this either affecting change or a new policy from the leaders of the crusade,
one at Corfu and one at Constantinople.208
At Corfu the dissenting party threatened to desert because they believed that attacking
Constantinople would take too long and was too dangerous and they wanted to go directly to
the Holy Land. 209 The threat of desertion was so real that this discontented group forced the
remaining crusaders and the Venetians to agree to their terms. These terms guaranteed
transportation for all discontents directly to the Holy Land within fifteen days of their request
and in return the discontents would stay with the crusade for another six months. This shows
the amount of power that the faction of discontented crusaders had gained. The reason for this
is rather simple: The discontents were a large number of crusaders and if they left, the crusade
would be doomed, according to crusade leader the Marquis of Montferrat.210 While it would be
misleading to say all crusaders gained power during this period it would be accurate to say that,
at the very least, the discontented crusaders’ voices became heard due to their large number
and importance to the mission so that they were able to force a policy change from the other
crusaders and the Venetians. While the discontented crusaders who remained with the crusade
didn’t directly alter its course, those who left and weakened the crusade had a direct impact on
the crusade’s manpower. Along with the weakening of the military force the discontent
crusaders were listened to but seemed to have been dissuaded at several points — the
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incident at Corfu and when Alexius IV asked the crusading host to winter in Byzantium — when
they were threatening to leave the crusade. 211
This party of discontents showed their influence for a second time when the crusading
forces were camped outside of Constantinople after re-installing Alexius. Alexius asked the
crusaders to stay and protect him and in return he would ensure that they got what he had
promised them. However, the six month’s had passed and the discontents demanded to be
given ships to go to the Holy Land. After their threats to leave and much debate, they decided
to remain because the Venetians agreed to stay with the crusade another year as long as
Alexius compensated them. Thus, this group of discontents once again shaped change in the
crusade and even forced the hand of the group that had previously forced theirs, the Venetians.
During this third period, the power of the crusaders seemed to steadily grow, especially
that of the discontents, but one event can be interpreted as a true ascendance of power —
although not necessarily within the crusade —the selection of a crusader as new Emperor of
Constantinople. However, the election of a crusader as emperor did not have a major impact
since it occurred at what this study considers the end of the Fourth Crusade. Even though it did
not have a major impact on the events of the Fourth Crusade it does perhaps provide evidence
for a power shift within the crusading host.
The third “group” to be analyzed in this period is only a single but important man,
Alexius IV, the leader of Byzantium. When Alexius was approached or approached the
crusaders, depending upon whose account you believe, the leadership dynamic drastically
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changed as previously discussed. 212 Alexius became the prime beneficiary of the crusade and
his the reinstallation of him as emperor became a primary objective of the crusade. Even
though reaching the Holy Land was still the ultimate objective of the crusade, another group’s
desires became its goal as well. Attacking of Constantinople in order to help Alexius and get
supplies in return was comparable to the crusaders helping the Venetians in the second period
to take Zara. The reaction of the discontent crusaders is also similar in this instance.
The power balance stabilized between the crusaders and the Venetians upon Alexius’
reinstallation as emperor of Byzantium, even as Alexius exerted influence on the crusade by
convincing the crusaders to postpone their journey to the Holy Land. But when he started to fail
to live up to his promises, he lost much of his influence. The crusaders were angry by this
betrayal and gave him an ultimatum: complete what you promised or face war. Alexius chose
the latter.
At this point the only effect Alexius had on the crusaders was instigating a conflict with
Byzantium. However, in an ironic twist, when Alexius was murdered, he suddenly had a great
impact on the crusade, perhaps greater than he had had as emperor. The crusaders used his
murder as a justifiable reason to attack and sack Constantinople to get the supplies and money
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they were promised, but also doing it in a way that Villehardouin presented as a collective
reaction to an injustice.213 Villehardouin always tried to justify the actions of the crusaders, and
the regicide of Alexius whom they had help to install seemed like the perfect excuse to take
what the crusaders wanted and have a justified reason for doing it. 214 Whether or not this is the
reason they attacked Constantinople after the death of Alexius cannot be known, but
Villehardouin believed it to be so.
So during this period Alexius actually had considerable influence over the crusade. He
offered resources and men in exchange for retaking his land and ultimately diverted the
crusade a second time. Through his deceitful acts and failure to pay the host, he brought the
crusading host and Byzantium into conflict. However, perhaps one of the most important ways
he affected the crusade was his death. However, capturing Byzantium also crippled the crusade
and effectively ended it with the coronation of the new crusader emperor of Constantinople.
The last “group” to examine in this period is once again a single man, Innocent III. At this
point, Innocent had seemingly lost control of the crusade; the crusaders had defied his wishes
in the second part of the crusade by attacking Zara and he eventually capitulated and pardoned
the crusaders. In the third period, there is very little mention of Innocent III and his legates.
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Their main contribution was to claim that attacking Constantinople after the murder of Alexius
was justified by God and the pope and that they had every right to rectify the evil committed
since they were on a pilgrimage. 215 Villehardouin doesn’t mention much else with respect to
the pope.
However, further evidence of the pope losing influence during this period comes from
his letter that reprimanded Peter, one of his legates stationed with the crusade. In this letter
Innocent angrily stated that the legate had no authority to absolve from their “pilgrimage vows
and their crusading obligations all the Crusaders who have remained to defend
Constantinople.” 216 The pope also claimed that since the crusaders did not fulfill their vows and
against his wishes by plundering without consequence that calling another crusade might be
much more difficult.217 The pope had begun to lose control in the second period and by the end
of the third period even some of his legates, such as Peter, were acting without his approval.
Innocent had consistently been opposed to the diversions and the extreme measures taken by
the host, especially the attacks on Zara and Constantinople. His influence drastically decreased
throughout the crusade and particularly so in the third period.
This period saw a host of leadership transitions and related internal dynamic shifts,
including influence transfer between groups, which greatly impacted the course of the crusade
and led to another diversion. The dichotomy within the crusading party also became more
visible in this period and culminated in a near desertion of a large number of crusaders at Corfu.
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The ultimate failure of the Fourth Crusade is directly linked to the events of this period,
especially the diversion that takes place in this period and the conquest of Constantinople. Thus
the internal dynamics and the leadership transitions of the third period are very influential in
the end result of the Fourth Crusade.

Chapter 8: Analysis of the Internal Dynamics and Leadership Transitions
and Their Overall Effect upon the Fourth Crusade
Since the individual periods have been analyzed along with their leadership transitions
and internal dynamics, the next step is to look at the themes and overall effects of several key
elements on the Fourth Crusade. As has been discussed above this study proposes that there
are the effects and patterns of these internal dynamics and leadership transitions principally
responsible for the diversion and failure of the Fourth Crusade. Examining the internal changes
and leadership shifts, an understanding of what possibly could have caused the diversions and
failure of the crusade is developed.
The first internal dynamics to examine are the different and shifting goals of the various
groups in the crusade. Often when a group shifts into a position of more power, — the
crusaders failed to complete their part of the treaty with the Venetians or the crusading host
agreeing to aid Alexius in retaking his throne — the objectives of that group or individual seem
to have more precedence. There are two instances of diversion that can be attributed to the
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shifting goals of the ascendant leadership and not just a series of accidents or treason as
scholars of the Fourth Crusade and Villehardouin propose. 218
The two major power shifts that occurred before the attack on Zara and the decision to
aid Alexius show this internal dynamic of shifting goals due to the leadership transitions. During
these leadership transitions it also becomes apparent that different groups may have had
different objectives. Innocent III stated that he wanted to retake Jerusalem and protect the
Christians who lived there. In general, the crusaders shared the same goals as Innocent but due
to their treaty debacle, some decided to use extreme means, which Innocent opposed, in order
to accomplish the goals. The Venetians also wanted to fulfill the goals of the crusade but had
more secular objectives such as protecting and strengthening their trading empire. Examples of
this are the new terms they proposed to the crusaders after they had failed to complete the
treaty and the fact that the Venetians took many spoils of war to fill their coffers.219 Alexius IV
also promised to support the crusade in the accomplishment of its goal, but in order for that to
happen Alexius’ other goal of being reinstalled as emperor of Byzantium had to happen first.
Therefore, as evidenced throughout this study, the groups involved with the crusade often rose
and fell with respect to their power and influence, and when a group gained ascendency, their
unique set of goals took priority and ascendency as well. This helps to disprove the claim that
one group held ultimate power and could hijack the crusade as the Venetian diversion theory
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purports. This also helps to explain why the crusade diverted when there were major leadership
transitions and why the priority of objectives shifted along with the leadership.
Another key internal dynamic is the threat of, and act of, desertion. This internal
dynamic exclusively pertained to the crusading party during the Fourth Crusade. The majority of
the desertions or threats of desertion occurred during times of moral crises. The first major
desertion occurred after the attack on Zara and after the decision was made to go to
Constantinople.220 The second major threat of desertion occurred while the crusaders were at
Corfu. The final threat of desertion occurred when Alexius IV asked to crusaders to winter in
Byzantium.
This internal dynamic played a key role in the policy of the crusading host after the first
wave of desertions at Zara. The crusading host had to make a new policy in order to appease
the crusaders wanting to desert because their numbers were so large that the crusade might
fail if they all deserted.221 This policy change to appease the discontent crusaders occurred at
Corfu and essentially gave the discontented crusaders a guaranteed way to leave the crusading
host after a few months if they still felt the need to go directly to the Holy Land — and they
would even be provided transportation. 222 With this policy change the crusading host seems to
have been held together, and there are no more recorded instances of desertion in the account
of Villehardouin until the threat of desertion at Constantinople. At Constantinople the
discontented crusaders wanted to invoke a policy that would allow them to leave the crusade
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but were convinced by the promises of Alexius IV and the Venetian and crusading leadership to
stay the winter and have the previous policy become active gain once the winter was over. 223
The desertions also played a role in the diversion of the crusade and its ultimate failure.
Those who deserted at Zara seemed to have done so because of their belief that they must go
to the Holy Land and that waiting to do so was wrong. The crusaders who were trying to desert
at Corfu seemed to have the same reasons for wanting to desert. Since the leadership of the
crusading host seemed so worried about losing so many soldiers because it would most likely
result in the failure of retaking Jerusalem, the leadership made a deal with the group as
previously discussed. Therefore, the leadership acknowledged the need for these crusaders to
stay in order for their effort to be successful, which points to the fact that the leadership was
well aware that if they didn’t accomplish their crusading vows, they would be shamed. Perhaps
if the discontents had opposed any solution but going to the Holy Land, then the crusade would
have been forced to do this with the means they had at that time. Therefore, it would seem
that since the discontents were able to be appeased on some level, the threats of desertion
didn’t prevent a diversion and the appeasement of these crusaders allowed for the diversion of
the crusade. These diversions, in turn, would result in the crusade getting bogged down in
Constantinople and ultimately failing to retake the Holy Land.
The third internal dynamic, the polarization of the crusading party, is closely related to
the fourth internal dynamic, the means justifying the ends. The polarization of the crusading
party occurred over the fact that two main groups in crusading party had very different views
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about whether or not certain means were justifiable and whether or not they could justify
delaying their arrival in the Holy Land. One group, as discussed above, believed their actions
were justified and that committing lesser evils to ensure the greater good was justifiable. This
would also include their decision to postpone their arrival in the Holy Land in order to get more
support that could help them achieve their goals more easily. The second major group was the
opposite. They were often labeled discontents because of their frequent outcries against the
delay of the journey to the Holy Land and the use of means they deemed unjustifiable.
The group that believed their actions were justified used various arguments both with
respect to the means employed and the delay in journeying to the Holy Land. From the analysis
reveals an attempt to justify actions by both the crusaders and the Venetians. 224 There are four
times that crusaders seem to justify their actions: the attack on Zara, the delay to traveling to
the Holy Land, the aiding of Alexius, and the final attack on Byzantium. The crusaders justified
attacking Zara by saying that they owed a debt to the Venetians and they needed to attack Zara
to hold the host together.
They justified the delay to the Holy Land at various times throughout the staying the
winter at Byzantium. Delaying the trip to the Holy Land was justified different ways at different
times during the crusade. At Zara when Alexius asks for aid, the crusaders justify the delay
because they were low on supplies and thought it was better to wait until they were better
supplied in order not to risk the failure of the crusade. Alexius promised them money, supplies,
and soldiers to help them retake Jerusalem so the crusaders delayed going to the Holy Land to
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try and gain these advantages. The crusaders justified the decision to delay at Constantinople
because it was winter and traveling them would make the journey to the Holy Land much more
difficult. They thought if they delayed their departure Alexius would be able to fulfill his debt to
the crusading host, and he would be able to gather an army to aid the crusading host.225 Once
again, this group of crusaders justified their actions by claiming that they would be in a better
position to accomplish their ultimate goal, according to Villehardouin.
The crusading host had very different reasons for justifying their final attack on
Constantinople. Alexius IV has just been murdered by Mourzuphles, and this had sent
shockwaves throughout the crusading host’s camp. The clergy who were embedded with the
crusaders claimed that “one guilty of such a murder had no right to hold lands, and that those
who consented thereto were abettors of the murder; and beyond all this, that the Greeks had
withdrawn themselves from obedience to Rome." 226 The clergy then goes on to say that the
crusaders were justified in attacking Constantinople in order to avenge the regicide and to bring
the Byzantines under control of the pope. 227 Thus, the justification for attacking Constantinople
was moral rather than strategic. The group of crusaders who were in opposition to the will of
the first group had consistent reasons to they think the crusade was wayward. This group
wanted to go to the Holy Land sooner rather than later and found the delays to be unjustified
as evidenced by many soldiers deserting after the first delay and planned diversion to
Constantinople.228 This group was also averse to attacking Christians and was not supportive of
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the diversions to Zara and Constantinople for this reason among others. It is important to note
that this group did not object to attacking Constantinople after Alexius was murdered. This
could be due to the fact that they had a moral reason to attack rather than a strategic one. If
this were the case, it would coincide with their previous opposition to the direction of the
crusade based upon what they judged as morally wrong. Therefore, it could be argued that this
group’s priority was moral obligation while the other group seemed have a more flexible in
morality as long as the means could be justified on some level.
The polarization of the crusader party created tensions within the crusading party that
resulted in many soldiers deserting and weakening the crusade. Perhaps if the crusading party
had been all of the same mind, it may have been harder for the diversions to occur since it
would be the Venetians would have been advocating for them and the whole of the crusaders
opposing. A unified crusading party, even if they supported the diversions, most likely would
have experienced more success than two constantly conflicting, struggling parties. Ultimately,
the disunity in the crusading party allowed for the diversions to Zara and Constantinople, which
in turn prevented the crusade from reaching the Holy Land.
The justification of means also played a part in both the diversion and failure of the
Fourth Crusade. By using justification, the crusaders managed to convince themselves that their
actions were proper. This includes the various delays and diversions that plagued the Fourth
Crusade. Without these justifications it can be argued that the crusaders as a whole may have
wanted to desert, like the group of crusaders who didn’t believe there was a justification for
said actions. If this had happened, then what would have followed is pure speculation;
however, since this did not happen there remained two opposing groups and whatever side the
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Venetians favored eventually won out. Therefore, since one group of crusaders could find
justification for their actions and one could not, a polarization of the crusading party occurred,
which resulted in the splitting of the power of the crusaders. In turn, this resulted in the ability
of the Venetians and the group of crusaders who believed the means were justified to delay
and divert the crusade, which led to its ultimate failure.
These leadership transitions have been discussed at length throughout this study for
good reason; they are intricately linked to the outcome of the Fourth Crusade. The transfer of
leadership periodically throughout the crusade created a situation in which its objectives
shifted with whomever was in ascendency of the crusading host’s leadership. Therefore, when
the crusade experienced the first major leadership transition, after the failure of the crusaders
to fulfill their treaty with the Venetians, the objectives of the ascendant Venetians diverted the
crusade to Zara. This set off a chain of events that would lead to the crusade needing supplies
at Zara and finding an answer to that need in the form of Alexius IV. Once again, the crusade
was diverted when the leadership was split and the Venetians were in favor of diverting to
Constantinople in order to obtain support and supplies. This final diversion led to a conflict
between the crusading host and Byzantium that resulted in the sacking of Constantinople and a
member of the crusading leadership being elected the new emperor of Constantinople,
effectively ending the Fourth Crusade.

Chapter 9: Conclusion
The Fourth Crusade, which initially set out to retake Jerusalem from Muslim Ayyubid
forces, ultimately failed. Its diversion ultimately led to the sack of one of the most powerful
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Christian cities, Constantinople. These diversions and the reasons behind them — treachery,
vengeance, and even chance — have been long debated. However, close examination and
analysis of leadership transitions and internal dynamics using two main primary sources,
Geoffrey de Villehardouin and Robert of Clari, proposes another possible answer. Several
groups with different and even shifting motives had varying influence at different stages in the
crusade, and these leadership transitions, along with accompanying internal dynamics and their
related effects, are responsible, on some level, for both the diversion and ultimate failure of the
Fourth Crusade.
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